The complexity of solving infinite games, including parity, mean payoff, and simple stochastic, is an important open problem in verification, automata, and complexity theory. In this paper, we develop an abstract setting for studying and solving such games, based on function optimization over certain discrete structures. We introduce new classes of recursively local-global (RLG) and partial recursively local-global (PRLG) functions, and show that strategy evaluation functions for simple stochastic, mean payoff, and parity games belong to these classes.
Introduction
The theory of infinite two-person adversary full information games is a well-established framework for modeling interaction between a system and its environment. A correct system can be interpreted as a player possessing a winning strategy against any strategy of the malevolent environment. In this setting, the verification process can be considered as a proof that the system possesses such a strategy. If the system loses, then a winning strategy for the environment encompasses possible system improvements. During the last decades, a substantial progress has been achieved both in fitting diverse approaches to computer-aided verification into the game-theoretic paradigm and in developing efficient algorithms for solving games, i.e., determining the winner and the winning strategy [16, 11, 19, 25, 39, 3] . A natural approach to solving games [23, 13, 33, 39, 3] consists in taking an initial strategy of the system and gradually "improving" it, since a nonoptimal strategy is outperformed by some counterstrategy of the environment. In this paper, we address the complexity of such approaches in an abstract model based on optimizing functions on sets of game strategies.
Game theory suggests, for numerous types of games, a nice characterization of the optimal solutions for behaviors of rational players, the so-called Nash equilibria. One of the major remaining problem left widely open is: "What is the exact computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria (optimal strategies) in two-person games with finitely many strategies? Could such games be solved in polynomial time?" This is a fundamental problem, the solution to which determines whether or not, and to what extent game theory will be applicable to solving real large-scale games emerging from practical verification of complex reactive systems [31] .
Our primary motivation consists in creating a unified theory of abstract optimization appropriate for solving different classes of infinite games, including parity, mean payoff, and simple stochastic games (SSG). It turns out that despite differences, these games possess common structural properties that allow us to abstract away irrelevant features when studying iterative improvement algorithms. This leads to a simple, general, and powerful optimization theory. It resulted in the first strongly subexponential randomized algorithms for parity [3] and mean payoff games (MPGs) [9] , as well as in a randomized subexponential algorithm for SSGs of arbitrary outdegree [5] . 1 Recent improvements and refinements of these results are reported in [7, 36, 9] .
1. Parity games (PGs) are infinite games played on finite directed leafless graphs, with vertices colored by nonnegative integers. Two players move a pebble along edges of the graph forming an infinite path. Vertices are partitioned between the players, and the owner of the vertex currently visited by the pebble decides where to move it next. The goal of one player is to ensure that the largest color visited by the pebble infinitely often is even, whereas the other player tries to make it odd. Deciding the winner in PGs is equivalent to the Rabin chain tree automata nonemptiness, as well as to the -calculus model checking [17, 16] . -calculus is one of the most expressive temporal logics of programs [16] , expressively subsuming virtually all known such logics. The problem is therefore significant in verification, automata theory, and also from the complexity-theoretic point of view, since it belongs to the complexity class NP ∩ CONP, but is not known to belong to P.
2. Mean payoff games (MPGs) [15, 20, 43] are another important motivation for studying iterative improvement. They are similar to PGs, but instead of colored vertices have integer-weighted edges, and the players try to maximize, respectively minimize, the average edge weight in the limit. PGs reduce to MPGs, and similar to PGs, the decision problem "whether a vertex value is above a given threshold" for MPGs belongs to NP ∩ CONP. MPGs can be used to design and analyze algorithms for job scheduling, finite-window online string matching, and selection with limited storage [43] .
3. Simple stochastic games: Stochastic games, an important generalization of Markov decision processes, relevant for the analysis and verification of adversary probabilistic systems, were introduced by Shapley [34] and many variants have been extensively studied since then [23, 14, 18] . In this paper, we restrict to a subclass of simple stochastic games (SSGs), in which players select moves in turns rather than simultaneously. SSGs were introduced and studied by Condon [12, 13] (see also [28, 43] ), motivated by complexity-theoretic analysis of randomized space-bounded alternating Turing machines. Both PGs and MPGs polynomially reduce to SSGs and thus can be solved by any SSG algorithms. However, the direct MPG and PG decision algorithms we suggest in this paper provide for a better complexity [9] . The decision problem, whether one of the players in an SSG can secure a given probability of reaching the distinguished vertex, also belongs to NP ∩ CONP.
The basic concept underlying all algorithms discussed in this paper consists in assigning values to strategies of one of the players, and then searching the strategy space guided by these values and making iterative strategy improvements. This approach relies on the fundamental positional determinacy property. It turns out that all the games mentioned are determined and solvable in pure positional strategies. This was first proved for MPGs by Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [15] , and for PGs by Emerson and Jutla [17] . (Simple) stochastic games have the same property; see, e.g., [34, 24, 12, 18] . Positional determinacy means that each vertex of every such game has a value, and that both players have pure (nonrandom) positional (memoryless) strategies that secure this value, whenever the game starts in the vertex; moreover, such strategies are uniform, independent of the initial vertex. Solving the game amounts to finding these values and strategies. We can thus limit our search to the finite set of all pure positional strategies.
A pure positional strategy of a player maps each of the player's vertices to one of its successors. Using the positional strategy the player always selects this successor, independently of the history of the play. The set of all positional strategies of a player is a Cartesian product of finite sets (of successors, for each vertex), and solving a game amounts to finding a global maximum of the strategy evaluation function on this product. In particular, if the player has at most two choices in each vertex, the space of all positional strategies is a Boolean hypercube. The resulting functions resemble those studied in the field of pseudo-Boolean optimization [10, 22] , in which local search [1, 38] is one of the dominating methods. In general, pseudo-Boolean functions cannot be efficiently optimized [38] , but for some subclasses, in particular, for the completely unimodal (CU) functions [21, 41, 40, 38] , the situation is more promising. They can be optimized in subexponential time using an adaptation of Ludwig's algorithm for SSGs [2] , based on ideas of Kalai [26] and Matoušek et al. [35, 30, 29] . A long-standing conjecture [41] is that CU-functions can be optimized in polynomial time.
In this paper, we generalize pseudo-Boolean functions and develop the abstract setting of hyperstructure optimization. The purpose is to facilitate the development and study of different algorithms for games. We introduce and study the classes of total and partial recursively local-global functions, and show that they are adequate to cover the above-mentioned games. In this abstract setting, we show that the subexponential, randomized algorithms for linear programming due to Kalai [26] and Matoušek et al. [29, 30] can be adapted to optimize a wide class of functions on hyperstructures, including the strategy evaluation functions for PGs, MPGs, and SSGs.
There is a well-known function for assigning values to strategies in SSGs [23, 13, 28] , with properties close to the CU-functions [2, 4, 5] . There is also a reduction from PGs via MPGs to SSGs [33, 43] . Thus, PGs and MPGs can be solved by reduction followed by optimization of the SSG value function. This approach has a downside, however. Each function evaluation involves solving a linear program with high precision. This is costly, both with regard to running time and development (typical off-the-shelf linear programming modules do not provide for the necessary precision). The randomized algorithm for SSGs by Ludwig [28] , is subexponential in the number of vertices of the game, only if the outdegree of vertices is at most two (or bounded by a constant). Unfortunately, reduction of arbitrary outdegree games to binary ones may increase the number of vertices quadratically, making the algorithm exponential.
Until recently, no convenient (discrete) strategy evaluation function for MPGs was known. In this paper, we present a new discrete strategy evaluation for MPGs, first discovered in [9] , and based on computing shortest paths. Together with the algorithms from combinatorial LP-type optimization, this shows that MPGs can be solved in strongly subexponential expected time, without the need for high-precision arithmetic. The evaluation measure also provides, by reduction, a new and efficient strategy improvement scheme for PGs.
Paper outline: After preliminaries on optimization over discrete structures, we proceed to SSGs, show that they define recursively local-global (RLG) strategy evaluation functions, which can be optimized in expected subexponential time. Then we address MPGs and partially RLG strategy evaluation functions they induce. In the end, we cover the case of PGs.
Optimization on discrete structures

Optimization on Boolean hypercubes
A function from the Boolean hypercube H = {0, 1} d to R is called pseudo-Boolean. Optimizing such a function is a problem of finding the vertex of the hypercube with the maximal (or minimal) function value. This problem has been extensively studied; see, e.g., [21, 40, 37, 41, 38, 10, 2] . In general, it requires exponential time in the dimension d of H [38] , and the research typically focuses on special subclasses of functions, such as the CU functions (injective, with unique maximum on every subcube) [21, 40, 41, 2] . One of the dominating approaches to pseudo-Boolean optimization is local search. The standard local search improvement algorithm starts in an arbitrary vertex of the hypercube and iteratively improves by selecting a next iterate with a better function value from a polynomial neighborhood (usually the set of vertices at Hamming distance one) of the current vertex. Specific instances of the standard algorithm are obtained by fixing a neighborhood structure on H, together with a discipline of selecting the initial vertex and the next iterate. The two major local search improvement algorithms, the Best Neighbor Algorithm (greedily selecting one of the best in the neighborhood) and the Random Better Neighbor Algorithm, have previously been extensively investigated and used for pseudo-Boolean optimization [38] . These algorithms perform well in practice and there is a long-standing conjecture that the Random Better Neighbor is polynomial for CU-functions [41] . However, the best currently known worst-case bounds for these algorithms are still exponential.
Hyperstructure optimization
SSGs and MPGs dealt with in this paper are played by two adversary players MAX and MIN on finite directed graphs. The players control two disjoint subsets of vertices, and when a token (pebble) comes to a vertex controlled by a player, that player moves it to some successor vertex by selecting an outgoing edge. In this way the players construct sequences of edges or plays. The rules of selecting edges are called strategies. A remarkable property of SSGs and MPGs is that optimal strategies are pure (nonrandom) and positional (memoryless), i.e., selection of edges may be done disregarding the history of the play (memoryless determinacy).
Combinatorially, the set of all pure positional strategies of player MAX in a game is isomorphic to a product of finite sets, each representing the player's choices in a vertex he controls. The number of vertices of MAX corresponds to the dimension. Evaluating strategies in games motivates our study of functions defined on the hyperstructures (products of simplices). Hyperstructures directly generalize Boolean hypercubes H = {0, 1} d , corresponding to the particular case when the player's choice in every vertex is binary. In Definition 2.1, it is convenient to identify P j with the set of outgoing edges from vertex j, i.e., with the choices available to the player in this vertex.
). An element of P is called a vertex. 2 Two vertices of P are neighbors if they differ in only one coordinate.
A substructure of P is a product
In terms of games and strategies, a substructure of the strategy hyperstructure P corresponds to the set of MAX strategies in a subgame in which some edges leaving vertices controlled by MAX have been removed, without creating sinks. Moving from a vertex of P to a neighbor is the same as making a single strategy switch in the underlying game.
Recall that a local maximum of a function f :
Here comes one of our central concepts.
Definition 2.2 (RLG-Functions)
. A function f : P → R is called RLG if on every substructure of P every local maximum of f is global. In this case, the pair (P, f ) is called an RLG-structure.
RLG-functions clearly generalize CU-functions. We will show that SSGs induce RLG-functions and those may be optimized in subexponential time. Note that RLG-functions are more general than Kalai's abstract objective functions (AOFs) [27] , because we do not stipulate uniqueness of local maxima. An even further generalization is achieved by partial RLG (PRLG-) functions in Section 8.
Simple stochastic games
We summarize main notions concerning SSGs, cf., [12, 43] . Starting in the initial vertex players MAX and MIN move a pebble along edges according to the following rules:
• When the pebble comes to a vertex u ∈ V MAX ∪ V MIN , the player who controls u selects an outgoing edge (u, v) , and the pebble moves to:
• vertex v with probability w(u, v).
• the 0-sink with probability 1 − w(u, v).
• From a vertex u ∈ V AVG the pebble goes to:
• one of the successors v of u with probability w(u, v).
• the 0-sink with probability 1 − (u,v)∈E w (u, v) . A play terminates in a sink. Player MAX/MIN tries to maximize/minimize the probability of reaching the 1-sink.
The value val(v) of a vertex v ∈ V is the probability that a play starting in v reaches the 1-sink, if both players act optimally.
The SSG decision problem is whether MAX can secure a given probability of reaching the 1-sink starting from the initial vertex.
A pure positional strategy of a player is a selection of exactly one outgoing edge from every vertex the player controls. For a strategy of a player in G denoted by G the game obtained by deleting all edges of the player in G, except those used in . A switch is a change of a single selected edge in a strategy.
Say that an SSG is discounted if both: (1) the probability assigned to every edge leaving a vertex in V MAX ∪ V MIN and (2) the sum of probabilities assigned to edges leaving a vertex in V AVG are strictly smaller than 1.
SSGs are known to be solvable in pure positional strategies [34, 12] .
Theorem 3.2. In every SSG every vertex has a value val(v), and the players possess pure positional strategies guaranteeing a value val(v) and val(v), respectively, against any strategy of the opponent, when the play starts in v.
Condon shows [12] (corrected in [43] ) that every SSG, with an arbitrary vertex outdegree, can be polynomially transformed into a discounted SSG with a negligibly different value, allowing for precisely determining the value of the original game (the result due to Shapley [34] , modulo polynomiality of the reduction). Thus, concentrating on discounted SSGs is no loss of generality. We need several details of the reduction from an arbitrary SSG G to a discounted SSG ; see [12, 43] . During the transformation, every edge (u, v) with assigned probability p in the original game G (here it is useful that edges of players MAX and MIN in G are initially given probability 1) splits into two edges: (a) one going to the 0-sink, with probability pq, and (b) the other, with probability p(1 − q), from u to v, where q is an appropriately selected exponentially small probability, negligible for determining the true value of a vertex in G. After that the edges of type (a) are discarded and the resulting SSG becomes discounted. Determining vertex values of discounted SSGs, for fixed MAX strategies, can be done by solving linear programs, as explained below. Definition 3.3. For a discounted SSG the associated system of linear constraints S contains the following constraints: For a pure positional strategy of MAX in denote by S ( ) the subsystem of S obtained by deleting all MAXconstraints in S , except those corresponding to edges used in .
The following theorem is a modification, to discounted SSGs of arbitrary outdegree, of the results due to Shapley [34] and Derman [14] ; see [12, Lemma 7, Theorem 2] . It will be used to assign values to hyperstructure vertices. (1)
Discounted simple stochastic games generate RLG-functions
In this section we prove the following:
Theorem 4.1. Every discounted SSG induces an RLG function.
We first describe how a discounted SSG induces a function (valuation) on its hyperstructure of pure strategies, and then prove that this function is RLG. Assume, till the end of this section, that is an arbitrary but fixed discounted SSG. Let P = d j =1 P j be the hyperstructure of pure positional strategies of MAX in , with P j corresponding to the set of edges leaving vertex v j ∈ V MAX . Define a (strategy evaluation) function f : P → R by associating to each strategy ∈ P the optimal value of the linear program (1) from Theorem 3.4.
The direct (inefficient) way to define the f -improving directions between neighbors on P would be to solve a linear program for every neighbor of the current strategy and to define switches to neighbors with bigger f -values as improving. We will proceed more efficiently, after introducing the important concepts of attractive and profitable switches. 
The following nice property is crucial for an efficient monotonic iterative strategy improvement.
Lemma 4.3. Every attractive switch is profitable.
Proof. The proof is based on the fact that all constraints in S have a monotonic form x P (x) + w, where P is a homogeneous linear polynomial with nonnegative coefficients (actually, discountedness in not used). Let have an attractive switch to , resulting in the replacement of the constraint v i pv j with v i p v k . If vector v * is a finite optimal solution to max( v i ∈V v i |S ( )), then v * satisfies v i pv j as equality; otherwise it is not optimal, since v * i can be increased. By monotonicity and attractiveness, v * also satisfies S ( ), but the new constraint v i p v k is satisfied as <. Therefore, v * i can be increased in S ( ) (this may only increase right-hand sides of other constraints; thus none of them will be violated), yielding a better solution, i.e., the switch is profitable. Moreover, none of the vertices decrease its value, and the vertex for which the switch was made strictly increases its value after the switch.
The next definition subsumes local optimality (see the proof of Theorem 4.1).
Definition 4.4 (Stability). A strategy without attractive switches is called stable.
Discountedness is essentially used in the proof of the following key lemma. The latter implies that v 0. Indeed, assuming v has a positive coordinate, select the largest such coordinate v i , and get a contradiction, because the corresponding constraint cannot be satisfied due to discountedness of S (the sum of probabilities on the right-hand side of constraint is < 1). But v 0 means that v = v * + v is no better than v * , and we get a contradiction with the assumption that improves a stable strategy .
We are now ready to complete the proof of the main claim in this section.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let P be a substructure of P, corresponding to a subgame of , in which some edges of player MAX are thrown away. The proof that every local maximum on P is global on P consists of two implications:
is locally optimal ⇒ is stable ⇒ is globally optimal. For the first implication, assume is not stable; then it has an attractive switch to a neighboring strategy, which has a bigger value than by Lemma 4.3. Hence, is not a local maximum. The second implication is proved by Lemma 4.5.
By an appropriate generalization (see, e.g., our work on controlled linear programming [8] ), the technique developed in this and preceding sections extends to Shapley's stochastic games [34] , in which players select moves simultaneously and accumulate payoffs throughout the course of play. These games also generate RLG-functions and are amenable to subexponential algorithms described in the next section.
Optimizing RLG functions in subexponential time Theorem 5.1. A global maximum of an RLG-function
Proof. The idea consists in modifying and adapting the randomized subexponential algorithm for linear programming due to Matoušek et al. [29, 30] for the RLG-functions. Note that in contrast to linear programming, the RLG-functions induced by SSGs are nonconvex. Algorithm 1 written in pseudocode is self-explanatory. It first checks (base case) whether the hyperstructure P has just one possible strategy 0 left. In line (4), it recurses on a substructure P\F obtained after deleting the facet F from P. In line (5), it checks attractiveness of a switch to the facet F, previously thrown away. The algorithm always terminates since the recursive calls in lines (4), (6) are made on strictly smaller substructures, and every switch in line (6) is profitable (monotonic improvement). It is correct since any vertex without better neighbors in an RLG-structure is globally optimal. Any MAX strategy 0 can be used in the initial call to the algorithm.
The subexponential expected running time follows from the analysis in [29, 30] . It is based on solving a probabilistic recurrence for the expected decrease of the so-called hidden dimension. The facets F i not containing vertex 0 define the total ordering by the largest value of the RLG-function f on P\F i . Choosing uniformly at random such a facet and finding an optimum on P\F i , the algorithm will never revisit any of the preceding substructures P\F j in the ordering. We refer the reader to [29, 30] for details.
Checking attractiveness in line (5) of Algorithm 1, for a discounted SSG , can be done (as explained in Definition 4.2) by using the optimal solution of the LP (1) for = 0 , which the algorithm may additionally return from line (2). If we want to avoid problems with nonstrongly polynomial LP-algorithms and high precision arithmetic (coefficients
choose a random facet F of P, not containing 0 (4) * ← MSW(P\F, 0 ) (5) if neighbor of * on F is better than * (6) return MSW(F, ) (7) else (8) return * for probabilities involved may be as close to 1 as 1 − 1/2 poly(n) , where n is the number of game vertices), we can rely on combinatorial subexponential LP-algorithms of Kalai [26, 27] , or Matoušek et al. [29, 30] . This will keep the same subexponential upper bound, but, as a disadvantage, will make the cost of just one switch subexponential rather than (nonstrongly) polynomial. An improvement showing how to avoid solving linear programs altogether in described in [36] . Note that Algorithm 1 generalizes Ludwig's 2 O( √ d) algorithm [28] , applicable to binary SSGs in which every MAX vertex has outdegree at most two. Actually, the algorithm coincides with Ludwig's on hypercubes, and thus is also
. Although an arbitrary outdegree SSG reduces to a binary SSG, this results, in general, in a quadratic blow-up in the number of vertices; hence, Ludwig's algorithm becomes exponential. Other LP-algorithms that can be adapted for subexponential RLG-optimization, with essentially the same subexponential bounds, are due to Kalai [26, 27] . Actually our first subexponential algorithm for PGs [3] was based on [26] .
Mean payoff games (MPGs)
MPGs [15, 20, 43, 32, 6, 9] are full-information infinite adversary games played on finite directed leafless 4 It turns out that MPGs are solvable in positional strategies for both players: every vertex has a value, which both players can secure by applying these strategies, independently of the initial vertex [15, 20, 6] . When a player fixes his positional strategy, an optimal counterstrategy of the adversary is polynomial time computable. Consequently, the problem whether this value is above/below a certain threshold is in NP ∩ CONP [43] .
The previous known algorithms for solving MPGs (finding strategies and values) are as follows: (1) An exponential in the number of vertices algorithm implicit in [15] . (2) A pseudopolynomial (in the largest absolute edge weight) based on potential transformations [20, 32] . (3) A pseudopolynomial based on dynamic programming and another one based on fixpoint iteration of a contractive mapping [43] . (4) A recent one, strongly subexponential in the number of vertices and simultaneously pseudopolynomial (in the largest edge weight), based on the new Longest-Shortest Paths (LSP) problem and randomized combinatorial linear programming [9] will be described here. (5) Another recent subexponential LCP-based algorithm is described in [7] . LCP stands for the Linear Complementarity Problem: find w, z 0 satisfying w = Mz + q and w T · z = 0.
Zero-mean partitioning for MPGs: It turns out that to find exact values of all vertices in an MPG, it is enough to determine their signs. This allows us to concentrate on a particularly simple problem [9] . Other MPG-related problems, including finding exact values, ergodic partitioning, optimal strategies, are all reducible to 0-mean partitioning, using dichotomy, edge reweighing, and approximation [20, 43, 9] . 
Longest-shortest paths: reduction from MPGs
We reduce the 0-mean partition problem to the following new controlled optimization problem [9] .
Definition 7.1 (Longest-shortest paths (LSP))
. Given a directed edge-weighted graph = (V ∪ {t}, E) with unique sink t and subset C ⊆ V of controlled vertices, make a selection of exactly one edge leaving each vertex from C in such a way that in the resulting graph (obtained by deleting all edges not in leaving vertices in C) the shortest paths distances from all vertices to the sink are as large as possible.
We may consider the LSP problem as a two-stage game: MAX selects a strategy in controlled vertices C, and MIN responds by computing the shortest paths in the resulting graph. The payoff is the vector of the shortest distances from each vertex to the sink, which MAX wants to maximize.
Remark. For a fixed selection the shortest distances in
to t may be computed in polynomial time by the BellmanFord algorithm. As usual, negative-weight cycles count as −∞ and positive-edge ones count as +∞. Zero-weight cycles may be counted as either +∞ or 0. To avoid complications, we may assume, without loss of generality, that the graphs we are interested in do not have 0-weight cycles; see Proposition 7.2.
The absence of 0-weight cycles is not a restriction for our purposes. Proof. For an MPG on n vertices, multiply the weight of each edge by n + 1 and subtract 1. This preserves the signs of all negative and positive cycles, but transforms all previously 0-weight cycles into negative ones. Therefore, this transformation does not change the 0-mean partition.
The reduction of MPGs to LSP instances is easy to describe.
Definition 7.3 (MPG to LSP reduction).
To solve the 0-mean partition problem for an MPG G, turn it into an instance of the LSP problem by adding to the graph of G the sink t, and retreat edges of weight 0 from every MAX vertex to sink t.
The correctness of this reduction is provided by the following:
Theorem 7.4. For an MPG G the positive mean partition V >0
G coincides with the set of vertices in the associated LSP for which the optimal distance is +∞, provided G has no 0-weight cycles (see Proposition 7.2).
Proof. Let MAX secure the +∞ distance for v in . Then he may use the same positional strategy in the MPG G (which never uses a retreat edge to the sink). By construction, this corresponds to a positive-weight cycle in G, and v ∈ V >0 G . Conversely, a positional MPG strategy in G securing a positive mean value secures a +∞ distance in the LSP instance .
Remark. This proof relies on the fact that MPGs are solvable in positional strategies (note that all strategies in the LSP problem are positional by definition). It is also important that an MPG has no 0-weight cycles. Otherwise, a 0-weight cycle enforced by MAX and cutting MIN from the sink gives distance +∞, but does not yield a positive mean.
Partial RLG-functions
In general, the LSP problem instances do not induce RLG-functions, because their strategy evaluation functions are not defined for every strategy (vertex of the associated hyperstructure). We need to extend RLG-functions to cover this case as well. Our extension to PRLG-functions simultaneously allows for: (1) Partially defined functions. PRLG-functions) . Let D be a partially ordered set. A partial function f : P D with domain X ⊆ P is called PRLG if, for every substructure P of P, every local maximum of f | P ∩X is also global on P ∩ X.
We start by demonstrating that LSP instances induce PRLG-functions. Afterward, we show that every PRLG-function can be maximized in randomized expected subexponential time. This can be done abstractly (generalizing Theorem 5.1), without involving any MPG-or LSP-related details.
LSP instances induce partial RLG-functions
Let us show that MPG-generated (Definition 7.3) LSP instances induce PRLG-functions. Let G be an MPG with n vertices, d of which belong to MAX, and be the corresponding LSP instance. The function f is a partial function on the hyperstructure P = d i=1 P i , where P i is a set of edges in (including retreat edges) leaving the ith vertex of MAX. The codomain of f is D = (R ∪ {+∞}) n , the set of n-vectors over reals R extended with +∞, needed to give values to positive infinite cycles. We assume that x < +∞ for every x ∈ R and denote by < the partial order defined by extending the total order < on R ∪ {+∞} coordinatewise: (x 1 , . . . , x n ) < (y 1 , . . . , y n ) iff x i y j for all i, and at least for one i the inequality is strict. Whenever the function f is defined on ∈ P, the ith component of the value vector f ( ) contains the shortest path distance from the ith vertex to the sink in the graph .
First, we define admissible strategies and their valuations.
Definition 9.1 (Strategy admissibility and valuation).
Say that a strategy ∈ P is admissible if for every vertex v of the length of the shortest path d (v) in from v to the sink is either finite or +∞. For an admissible strategy ∈ P the value function is defined as
For an inadmissible strategy the value function is undefined.
Corollary 9.5 shows that f thus defined is a PRLG-function. Note that f is partially defined, in general, and has a partially ordered codomain. Admissibility is polynomial time verifiable. Use the Bellman-Ford (or any available) algorithm to compute the single sink shortest distances. It will automatically detect negative cycles, if any, thus determining inadmissibility. Otherwise, it will produce the valuation (2) . Note that in the MPG-generated LSP instances there is always an admissible strategy in which MAX selects moving to the sink from every vertex.
Second, we formalize the concept of attractive switch. 
Note that deciding attractiveness is easy: only the known shortest distances with respect to the current strategy are used in (3) .
Third, we show that making attractive switches guarantees monotonic increases in strategy evaluation. Remark. By the same argument, making simultaneously several (rather than just one at a time) attractive switches is profitable, but we do not need it in this paper.
Theorem 9.3 (Attractiveness is profitable). Every attractive switch → preserves admissibility and guarantees profitability, i.e., f ( ) < f ( ).
Proof
In , MAX has all strategies available, while MIN has just one. Nevertheless, we will show that in no strategy of MAX can improve over d (v 0 Let MAX use an allegedly better than strategy from v 0 in undergone the potential transformation above. Since MIN has just one available strategy, defines a unique play, in which every edge traversed is nonpositive by the explanation above. This play may be either finite, or infinite.
Suppose it is finite, terminating in the sink. Let and be the paths from v 0 to the sink t in determined by and , respectively, and functions c, c give paths costs before and after the potential transformation. We have If the play is infinite, then the value for v 0 under must be −∞. Indeed, by assumption (w.l.o.g.), the graph does not contain 0-weight cycles, and this property is preserved during any potential transformation. All edges used by MAX in and by MIN have nonpositive weights after the potential transformation above. Since there are no zero-weight cycles, the only possible cycles are negative. Therefore, gives no improvement in this case neither. This contradiction shows that is indeed an optimal strategy. By Theorems 9.3 and 9.4 we immediately obtain the desired. Algorithm 1 (with RLG-replaced with PRLG-) and the subexponential bound remain the same as in Section 5. Note that the availability of an initial vertex in which the function is defined is essential. Indeed, consider a PRLG-function defined exactly in one vertex of the hyperstructure. Then finding this vertex cannot be done without full (exponential) vertex enumeration. Luckily, the MPG-generated LSP instances always have an admissible MAX strategy "go to the sink everywhere" available. Note that after finding an optimal strategy * on P\F in line (4) the algorithm has the shortest paths distances from all vertices to the sink (which may be returned from line (2) , in addition to 0 ). Thus, it avoids solving linear programs and is purely combinatorial. The second bound follows from the fact that the algorithm proceeds by monotonic (profitable) switches, each time increasing the distances in (2) by integral increments.
Although MPGs are known to be polynomially reducible to SSGs [43] (thus the subexponential algorithm from Section 5 applies), the LSP-based algorithm has a crucial advantage. It does not rely on solving linear programs, either by nonstrongly polynomial methods (and associated precision and stability issues), or by strongly subexponential methods (with worse hidden constants and subexponential time per iteration).
A recent paper [42] demonstrates that LSP instances with nonnegative edge weights can be optimized in polynomial time, by an extension of Dijkstra's algorithm. Note that the reduction from MPGs requires, however, negative weights.
Parity games
A scheme for assigning discrete values to strategies in PGs and an exponential iterative strategy improvement algorithm for PGs were described in [39] . In [3] we suggested a modification of the strategy evaluation function from [39] , which provides for a better complexity analysis (including a subexponential bound). Now, by reusing our development for MPGs and the LSP problem, we obtain an even faster and much simpler iterative strategy improvement algorithm for PGs.
Given a PG P, transform it into an MPG M by assigning all outgoing edges from a vertex of color c ∈ N the weight (−n) c , where n is the number of game vertices. It is immediate that in the original game P player MAX secures an even color infinitely often iff MAX in M secures a positive mean. Note that 0-weight cycles in M are impossible by construction. Therefore, solving PGs reduces to the 0-mean partitioning for MPGs, and our subexponential algorithm applies. In addition, since the algorithm makes only profitable switches with integral increments, the total number of iterations is also pseudopolynomial O(poly(n)W ), where W is the largest edge weight W = O(n k ), where k is the maximal color. Note that W can be considerably decreased (thus improving the pseudopolynomial bound) by assigning weights w i to edges leaving vertices of color i more sparingly: w 0 = 1 and w i+1 = the total weight of all edges leaving vertices of colors of the opposite parity up to i; see [9] for details . Thus, the LSP-based algorithm described above inherits all advantages of the algorithms [39, 3] , is more general, provides for even better worst-case bounds, and is much more simple to explain and implement than both.
Conclusions
We introduced and investigated recursively local-global (RLG-) and partial recursively local-global (PRLG-) functions on Cartesian products of simplices and showed that these functions are abstract counterparts of strategy evaluation functions in infinite parity, mean payoff, and SSGs on finite graphs. Solving such a game amounts to finding a global maximum of a (P)RLG-function. These functions generalize CU pseudo-Boolean functions [21, 40, 41, 38] , as well as AOFs [27] . We demonstrated that RLG-and PRLG-functions, hence all the above-mentioned games, can be optimized/solved in randomized subexponential time. A further effort is needed to understand and extract additional combinatorial properties of games (in addition to already captured by RLG-and PRLG-functions) in order to improve on a subexponential analysis.
